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THE NEW PRIVACY
Paul M. Schwartz* and William M. Treanor**

OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY. By John Gilliom. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press. 2001. Pp. xv, 186. Cloth, $ 39; paper, $16.

INTRODUCTION

In 1964, as the welfare state emerged in full force in the United
States, Charles Reich published The New Property, one of the most
influential articles ever to appear in a law review. 1 Reich argued that
in order to protect individual autonomy in an "age of governmental
largess," a new property right in governmental benefits had to be
recognized.2 He called this form of property the "new property."3 In
retrospect, Reich, rather than anticipating trends, was swimming
against the tide of history. In the past forty years, formal claims to
government benefits have become more tenuous rather than more
secure. Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance and the Limits
of Privacy, by John Gilliom, an associate professor of political science
at Ohio State University, demonstrates both the tenuousness of wel
fare rights today and the costs that this system imposes on individual
autonomy.
In Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom uses his case study of welfare
recipients as the occasion for an attack on classic notions of privacy
rights. Gilliom finds that welfare clients do not engage in "privacy
talk" - indeed, he finds the concept to be devoid of value for the wel* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1981, Brown; J.D. 1985, Yale. Berlin
Prize Fellow, American Academy in Berlin, Germany (Fall 2002); Transatlantic Fellow,
German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Program, Brussels, Belgium (Spring 2003). - Ed.
Professor Schwartz would like to thank Gary Smith of the American Academy in Berlin as
well as Bill Antholis and Bill Drozdiak of the German Marshall Fund for offering stimulat
ing and collegial international environments for scholarship. For comments on previous
drafts, we would like to t hank Robert Gellman, Michael Gerhardt, Ted Janger, Lance Lieb
man, Robert Post, and Daniel Solove.
**

Dean, Fordham Law School. B.A. 1979, Yale; AM. 1982, Harvard; J.D. 1985, Yale.

-Ed.
1. Charles A. Reich,

The New Property,

73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).

2. Id. at 777; see CHARLES A. REICH, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WELFARE:
THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 1246, 1256 (1965) (discussing necessary "objective eligibility
safeguards against revocation or loss of benefits").
3.

See

Reich, supra note 1, at 787 ("We must create a new property.").
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fare recipients. Here, another comparison can be made with Reich's
new property. Reich explicitly tied his idea of a property right in
government entitlements to privacy.4 He felt that the new property
was needed to protect privacy and, in particular, individual autonomy.5
Reich's notion of privacy reaches back to a classic concept of privacy,
one that we term the "old privacy." It is precisely this classic idea that
Gilliom finds welfare recipients to have rejected.
Theoretical work inside and outside of the legal academy has
pointed, however, to a "new privacy."6 The new privacy is centered
around Fair Information Practices ("FIPs'i) and is intended to prevent
threats to autonomy. The idea of privacy centered on FIPs is based not
on a property interest in one's information, but the idea that proces
sors of personal data should be obliged to follow certain standards. If,
as we will see, classic notions of privacy are not of much use in the
welfare state, the new privacy may be.
This Review begins by examining Gilliom's methodology and
findings. It credits the insights of his look at the inner world of welfare
recipients, but finds that he appears to ignore the need for income
limits on aid recipients and the concomitant need for at least some
personal information to enforce these limits. It also criticizes his fail
ure to explore an interaction of an "ethics of care" among welfare
recipients with possible use of retooled privacy rights or interests.
In the second part of this Review, we consider the extent to which
theoretical work inside and outside of the legal academy points to a
new privacy and discuss how Gilliom's empirical research provides
support for that scholarship. We also evaluate the extent to which the
new privacy, centered on FIPs, can prevent the threats to personal
autonomy so poignantly identified by Gilliom.
I.
Gilliom considers the "everyday politics of surveillance . . . by
those who are among the most closely watched" (pp. 3-4). His
research began with the idea of studying a group of "people [who] live
with surveillance as a totalizing and encompassing force which can
critically affect their well-being" (p. 42). Accordingly, Gilliom decided
to engage in an ethnological exploration of welfare recipients, who
in the mid-1990s were among the most closely scrutinized of any
Americans. Specifically, Gilliom carried out empirical research
concerning the attitudes of a small group of low-income women in
Appalachian Ohio towards welfare bureaucracy and information
4. Id.

at 778.

5. Id.

6. We discuss the old and new privacy in Part II of this Review.
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surveillance. To a lesser (but equally fascinating) extent, Gilliom also
looked at the attitudes of caseworkers in local welfare offices in south
ern Ohio.
In analyzing the interaction of welfare clients and bureaucracy,
Gilliom first had to select a methodology. He decided not to work
through the state-welfare bureaucracy because one of his "central
interests was coming to know what the agencies cannot see or what
they would forbid if they could" (p. 45). Instead, Gilliom and his assis
tants engaged in a series of in-depth and semistructured interviews
with current welfare recipients as well as caseworkers in southern
Ohio.
Interestingly enough, the interviews with the welfare clients, as
opposed to those with the caseworkers, were carried out not by
Gilliom, but by two former welfare recipients as paid project consult
ants. A number of strategic choices were involved in having consult
ants conduct these interviews. Gilliam's hope was that his consultants
would be able to draw on their personal experience with welfare and
their knowledge of Appalachian Ohio, and that "shared gender and
social status, as well as the notable accent of the region, would help to
establish a quicker relation of trust and more complete sharing of per
spectives and practices" (p. 45). His use of the former welfare recipi
ents as interviewers was also intended to help gain more distance from
conventional discourse about privacy. Since the interviewers were
unlikely to be steeped in the relevant academic and policy literature,
their interactions with the welfare clients would be less likely to bias
the field research (p. 45).
The final elements in the methodology of Overseers of the Poor
involved finding a sample group for the interviews and selecting an
interviewing technique. The sampling technique was informal: Gilliom
opted for a "snowball" sampling in which the field interviewers
followed initial interviews with welfare recipients whom they knew
"with a request for a few names of other people . . . and for permission
to mention the first subject's name in a personal introduction to those
people" (p. 46). The interviewing· technique involved taping semi
structured interviews based on Gilliam's script. In the end, Gilliam's
team interviewed forty-eight mothers from a four-county area.
Gilliom concedes that this sample cannot be certified as
" 'scientifically representative' " (p. 46). But his aim was a different
one than locating a sample that he could prove was representative; he
wanted "to find access to the welfare poor of the region in a way that
would offer the level of trust necessary to undertake meaningful inter
views about topics which might include illegalities" (p. 46). Gilliom
succeeded in this task; his interviews cast a brilliant light on the atti
tudes, language, and self-conception of at least one set of people
receiving public assistance.

2166

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:2163

What did the interviews reveal? Gilliom first notes the general
diversity of those in poverty and the differences among those inter
viewed by his study. He observes: "In many ways, there is so much
diversity that catch phrases like 'the welfare poor' are, even if used as
a shorthand, categorizations that belie the true complexity and
particularity of the population" (p. 65). But he also identifies some
significant similarities among his sample group. In particular, Gilliom
concluded this group both lacked any notable rights consciousness and
made almost no tactical use of the law (p. 70). In this relative void,
however, Gilliom discovered a different language and different kinds
of activities.
Gilliom describes an important phenomenon that he terms "rights
talks and rights reticence" (p. 69). Following his research into how
welfare clients view issues of "welfare administration, surveillance,
and client information policy," Gilliom finds a striking lack of recourse
to "the discourse of rights" (p. 70). By "rights talk," Gilliom specifi
cally means "privacy rights talk." But what would "privacy rights talk"
sound like for welfare clients? To be sure, welfare recipients talked
about the indignities and oppressiveness of constantly being moni
tored (p. 67). But welfare clients did not react to this experience with a
belief either that they had "a right to be let alone," to use the classic
term of Warren and Brandeis,7 or that they had existing legal interests
that would allow them to oppose these practices (pp. 70-71). Instead,
they engaged in "a more personalized discourse of need, care and
responsibility" (p. 92).
The welfare clients' great concern was to provide for their families
when supplied with a monthly welfare check that they viewed as
inadequate to provide for their needs. Gilliom stresses at several
points that the low level of support provided by state welfare was
inadequate and drove its recipients to find ways to supplement their
income that the state bureaucracy would not detect. As he writes,
"very few people could be eligible for aid and make it through the
month on welfare without such measures" (p. 67). Thus, Delilah, one
of the recipients interviewed, was cutting hair and helping her brother
wallpaper while receiving payment in cash to evade the computers of
the Ohio bureaucracy. When she talked about this behavior, Delilah
did not engage in "privacy talk," but stressed her obligation to her
family. As she stated, "I think as long as someone is using what they
are doing for their home or they are buying something that their kids
need, I don't see anything wrong with it" (p. 94). As Elizabeth,
another mother, said: "[M]y girl means more to me than what they're
gonna do" (p. 95). Or in Dewey's words, "[Y]our kids come first"
(p. 93).
7. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
1 93 (1890).

The Right to Privacy,

4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
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Gilliom reports the existence of "an ethics of care" of the kind that
Carol Gilligan first elaborated in her famous book, In a Different
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development.8 As Gilliom
summarizes this work by Gilligan, "[T]he ethic of care emphasizes
responsibilities, particular needs and differences, and compassion" (p.
109). A discourse of care leads not to a discussion of an individualistic
right to privacy, but "an emphasis on responsibility, on particular
needs, on care for dependents" (p. 109).
Gilliom views the welfare clients in his study as adopting an ethics
of care because it is the most logical point of reference from which to
organize their world. He writes, "[W]e should view these women not
as being driven by some structure of language or perception, but,
rather, as choosing from among the many terms and references that
we can use to make sense of our lives and our conditions" (p. 111).
The women at the center of his book faced "abusive practices in wel
fare administration, rural isolation, and low education" (p. 111).
Moreover, their lives were "surrounded by the obligations of meeting
both the needs of their dependents and the commands of those upon
whom they depend" (p. 111). The consequence: "In many critical
dimensions, then, their lives, roles, experiences, and values appear to
gravitate away from the assertion of individualistic rights and toward
the focus on responsibility and care" (p. 111). Thus, the female welfare
recipients at the center of Gilliam's book challenged the legitimacy of
state government's attempts to gain information on them but not on
the ground that the state's scrutiny involves their privacy rights.
Rather, "their lives, roles, experiences, and values" led them to offer
an alternative critique (p. 111). They challenged the state's informa
tion collection on the grounds that this data processing might lead to
the denial of benefits and thus prevent them from satisfying "the
needs of their dependents and the commands of those upon whom
they depend" (p. 111). With loved ones who needed help on one side,
and the welfare bureaucrats and their computers on the other, the wel
fare clients viewed the idea of privacy rights as empty.
Beyond the ethics of care, Overseers of the Poor also identifies a
cluster of three additional factors that led the welfare recipients away
from a privacy discourse: (1) their lack of knowledge of how their per
sonal data were actually being processed and their accompanying
dread about surveillance; (2) their generally low level of actual rights
or other legal interests; and (3) a lack of an active legal movement to
help them (pp. 71-72). Thus, the interviews revealed the widespread
ignorance of welfare recipients about the precise databases to which
the computers of the Ohio welfare administration were linked and an
oppressive worrying about the level of scrutiny into their lives. In
8. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1993).
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interview after interview, Gilliam's assistants recorded complaints
about the degradation that the welfare system visited upon the recipi
ents. For example, Mary explained: "You have to watch every step
like you are in prison. All the time you are on welfare, yeah, you are in
prison" (p. 51). Gilliom also found the women plagued by strong feel
ings of guilt about their self-help measures.
The other factors that undercut any privacy talk are the low level
of actual rights or other legal interests for welfare recipients and a lack
of financial resources or an active legal movement to help them. On
these points, Gilliom traces a decline in activity to assist welfare
recipients by the judiciary, legislative branch, and public interest
organizations since a high point during the mid-1960s. As Gilliom
concludes, "Welfare mothers, as constituted by their ongoing relation
ships and status within the welfare bureaucracy, are almost the inverse
of the rights-bearing individual who would rise up against surveillance
with a legal challenge" (p. 91).
By this point in Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom has shifted from his
earlier, apparently dialectical proposition that pitted the ethics of care
against privacy. Gilliam's ultimate view is not dialectic; rather, it is
simply that a group of people lacking financial resources and possess
ing almost no privacy or legal rights are unlikely to view their world
through the privacy perspective (pp. 70-73). Gilliom admits, in fact,
"the importance of context . . . in the formation and mobilization of
rights claims and protest" (p. 84). This analysis suggests that the ethics
of care could form part of a heightened interest in privacy rights. Later
in this Review, we will discuss Fair Information Practices as the neces
sary legal building blocks of modern information privacy rights. At
this point, we only wish to introduce the point that an ethics of care
and recognition of privacy rights can reinforce each other as a basis for
challenging information collection. A group with better defined inter
ests, institutional support, financial resources, and access to legal re
sources might seek to protect their loved ones and affirm its connec
tions with them through privacy claims. Here, Gilliom might have
considered activities by public interest groups engaged in the area of
welfare reform. The critical question is whether any interest group
activity would encourage "the formation and mobilization of rights
claims and protest" (p. 84).
The first part of Gilliam's findings concerns the presence of an
ethics of care among welfare recipients. The second part reveals a pat
tern of everyday resistance rather than formal legal claims. At this
point in Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom explores the actions that wel
fare recipients take and how they attempt to shield their behavior
from the awareness of the welfare bureaucracy. Faced with state scru
tiny, a level of monthly care they find inadequate, and ignorance about
important parts of the welfare system, the mothers seek cash-only jobs
that they hide from welfare services; obtain gifts in kind from relatives
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and friends; and enlist others in their community in avoiding rules (pp.
93-114).
For Gilliom, these welfare mothers engage in important acts of
"everyday resistance" that attempt to reject and challenge "the politi
cal commands of the state" (p. 100). Instead of legal or political
mobilization, the welfare mothers in the book carry out in important
"daily actions seeking to frustrate the mission of the welfare bureauc
racy and its surveillance system" (p . 92). Gilliom summarizes: "Rather
than publicly objecting to the infringement of their rights as citizens,
they quietly meet the needs of their dependents through daily actions
that defy the commands of the state" (p. 111).
While this struggle is quiet, it is.not lonely; Gilliom discusses "clear
evidence of mutual support and cooperation among the mothers" and
within their larger community (p. 106). As a specific example of such
community cooperation, one mother in the study, Mary, talks about a
helpful convenience store clerk, who allowed her to use food stamps
to buy diapers and other family necessities. She stated, "I mean, I
don't buy whiskey or anything, but you can't make it if you can't buy
your diapers and your laundry soap and things . . . . " (p. 49).
Yet, resistance has its price. Gilliom finds that welfare recipients
feel guilt and degradation, among other emotions, caused by their
everyday evasions. He notes the "mixtures of defiance, fear, pride,
guilt, and anger" involved in their struggles "to scrape up a little extra
cash, or use food stamps for diapers, or hide resources which might
threaten their eligibility" (p. 67). The presence of these emotions
shows that the welfare recipients have accepted and internalized, at
least to some extent, the demands of the all-knowing surveillance
system. With reference to seminal work by Michel Foucault, Gilliom
talks of "the frequent emergence of guilt and regret over the rule
breaking [as] an important sign of the 'internalizing of the gaze' that
Foucault writes of."9
Although the bureaucratic gaze has been internalized, resistance
continues. It is striking that parallel resistance can also be found
among caseworkers in the welfare system. As Gilliom notes, computer
surveillance is intended to control not only recipients, but caseworkers
and other administrators (pp. 96-99). Rather than a system that allows
local discretion, the state seeks to impose hierarchical control from the
.

9. P. 133. The scholarship in question is MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1995) (1975).
Foucault discusses Jeremy Bentham's 1787 proposal for a Panoptican, a prison building
constructed in the form of a wheel to allow surveillance by a warden located in a central
area. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICAN WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995)
(1787). For further discussions of the Panoptican, Bentham, and Foucault, see Jamie Boyle,
Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignity, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CJN. L.
REV. 177, 177-78 (1997). See also OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 53-94 (1993).
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top down. Yet, local officials battle against such control. Thus, a case
worker identified only as "T" explained that she fights the computer
system by putting false information into it. "T" wishes to avoid the
computer's denying benefits to people who, in her view, were clearly
eligible. As she states, "We can't wait until the state decides to repro
gram [the computer]. I mean, we have to get these people a check if
they're eligible for it and I guess you have to do it by whatever means
possible because we have no other way" (p. 98). One is left wishing
that Gilliom devoted more time and space to exploring the views of
the caseworkers. This evidence of resistance from within the system
provides a tantalizing suggestion of internal limits on bureaucratic
rationality. 10
In a nutshell then, Gilliom views the chief contribution of his
research as its "exploration of the everyday consciousness of people
who are struggling with political domination on their own and in the
absence of organization or support" (p. 85). In place of rights talk, he
describes both an ethics of care and the politics of everyday resistance.
And in Gilliom's view, our future experience may well look like the
present condition of the welfare mothers of his book. In a key passage
he argues:
Once elaborate systems of bureaucratic surveillance are erected, it may
be especially difficult to confront them with conventional political chal
lenge. And as mechanisms of surveillance push the issues of visibility and
verification to the forefront of long-standing struggles between citizens
and institutions, practices of deception, camouflage, and secrecy are the
necessary politics of our times. Everyday tactics of evasion, subterfuge,
and concealment, then, may very well become a defining form of politics
in the surveillance society. (p. 101)
Gilliom also faults privacy laws that seek to limit surveillance pro
grams with requirements of access and correction. In his view, rather
than these underused legal rights, a more likely future pattern will be
"complaint, evasion, and resistance" by affected individuals (pp. 101,
112).
Finally, in a coda to Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom offers a first
hand account of his own experiences in the summer of 1999 as he
sought to complete the book. In August 1999, law enforcement offi
cials landed at Gilliom's farm, searched his back fields and hills, and
an adjacent national forest, and then obtained a warrant and searched
his home. This armed invasion, search of his home, and investigation
of Gilliom and his wife for federal felonies amounted to a "rapid,
intense, and visceral education into the politics of surveillance, pri
vacy, power, and the law" (p. 137).

10. For a classic exploration from the 1 980s of these limits within the administration of
social security disability claims, see JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
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In his account of these events, Gilliom first describes the setting of
his home as "an aging farmhouse situated in a small valley of about
sixty rough, hilly, and mostly wooded acres" (p. 138). His house is
surrounded by forests of private and public land, and the region of the
state in which he lives is known both for its marijuana cultivation and
constant observation by the. helicopters of the State Bureau of
Criminal Identification and Investigation. When the police helicopters
landed at his home, his housesitters reached him out of town, where
Gilliom was visiting friends, to tell him of this development. Gilliom
assured them that "[w]e were innocent of wrongdoing and had no rea
son for concern" (p. 139). As Gilliom w'rites, he knew that he was
innocent of growing the marijuana, but "I was lying . . . with the asser
tion that we had nothing to worry about" (p. 139).
Gilliom was worried because he and Amy King, his life partner,
had been vocal and public critics of the local police department.
Moreover, King was the head of the regional branch of the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). With King, Gilliom had engaged in
high profile activism to challenge the practices of local police, includ
ing the policies of narcotic officers and prosecutors. In fighting the war
on drugs, the local constabulary "had committed strings of rights viola
tions" (p. 139). Gilliom reports that, beyond violating individual rights,
local law enforcement had engaged in offenses including "an almost
endless string of corruptions, excesses, and embarrassments among the
law enforcement agencies and the offices of the county prosecutor" (p.
139). In light of his activism, Gilliom advises us, "I hope that the
reader can pause and imagine absolutely every nook and cranny of
your home ransacked not just by strangers, but by strangers who
would probably like nothing more than to hang you out to dry" (p.
145).
The search of Gilliom and King's home did not lead to formal
charges against them, and he in turn decided not to sue the law
enforcement officials. With the passage of some time, Gilliom organ
ized his thoughts about this experience around two insights. First, he
and his life partner engaged in a mixture of both law talk and care talk
in reaction to the search and its aftermath. As for the law talk, Gilliom
notes, "We had called a defense attorney within minutes of hearing
the news; hired a former judge as our attorney within a few days; and
consulted with the state director of the ACLU and a widely recog
nized civil rights attorney in subsequent weeks" (p. 147). Gilliom
attributes his recourse to rights talk, in contrast to the welfare clients,
to his superior resources and better awareness of legal language ("due
process, warrants, the Fourth Amendment") (p. 147).
As for the care talk, Gilliom notes how he and his life partner
worried most about "the impact of arrest or litigation on our children"
(p. 147). He observes:
In short, every calculation and decision that we attempted to make about
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how we were going to cope with the law was embedded in a context of
thinking about our own needs for money, security, and dignity and our
children's needs for a sane household, nonincarcerated parents, and, of
course, all the money we might need to spend on litigation. (pp. 147-48)
Thus, Gilliom's report of his personal experience shows that privacy
rights and care are not opposed, but rather embedded in a given
context that shapes their relation to each other.
Gilliom's second set of insights concerned the nature of the politics
of surveillance. He found that while the invasion of his home was "a
massive violation of our privacy," that was perhaps "the most fleeting"
of the harms suffered (p. 149). He writes, "What continued was how
the structures of power, surveillance, and law interacted with the reali
ties of our daily lives to rob us of what we felt to be both our integrity
and our citizenship" (p. 149). Gilliom ultimately decided not to sue the
authorities for the violation because of the accompanying stress,
money to be spent on lawyers, and "the possibility that poking the
authorities with a lawsuit would provoke retaliatory action" (p. 149).
Regarding the language of rights, Gilliom sadly concludes, "[A]ll the
accessibility that we had felt regarding the language of rights was
misleading. We could speak them, but we could not really afford
them" (p. 149).
Thus, for Gilliom, the experience of surveillance caused a harm to
his self-image and his desire and capacity to engage in activism. He
writes, "The combined impact of the state's power to compel, watch,
and punish, the sheriff's power to retaliate against challenge, and our
duty to meet the needs of our family, has stolen the senses of auton
omy and control upon which full citizenship is based" (p. 150). In his
view, this loss hurt him more than the theft of his privacy when his
house was ransacked. Gilliom ends his book by noting that like the
welfare recipients, "We are all watched, we are all angry, and we are
all afraid. And we are increasingly without a language to speak about
it" (p. 150).
This incident and Gilliom's response to it suggest how surveillance
stifles dissent. But in challenging surveillance by law enforcement
agencies, Gilliom does not confront the other side of the equation.
Obviously, there is a legitimate role for criminal investigation in the
realm of criminal-law enforcement. This critique of Gilliom's discus
sion of law enforcement is equally applicable in his treatment of wel
fare oversight, where there is a similar necessity of some surveillance
by the state.11 Here, we wish to leave criminal procedure behind and
return to the topic of welfare oversight.
11. At least some surveillance by private parties is also needed at times, see, for exam
ple, Anita Allen, The Wanted Gaze: A ccountability for Interpersonal Conduct at Work, 89
GEO. L.J. 2013 (2001) (discussing need for accountability in the workplace, including work
place monitoring of employees, to prevent sexual harassment of working women).
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At times, Gilliom writes as if the government has no valid interest
in gathering information about welfare recipients. He seems to regard
the so-called "declaration era" of the late 1960s with straightforward
approval. This was a short-lived epoch when "the poor - at least in
some regions of the country - [were] in the position of advancing
their own version of needs and budgets, their own version of
resources, and their own take on the government's 'mean's test' " (p.
29). During that period, "program administrators placed greater
emphasis on accepting the terms and condition of poor people's needs
as they were presented by the poor themselves" (p. 28). This state of
affairs is a potential prescription for disaster. Imagine any group in
society, regardless of the identity of this aggregation, able to advance
"their own version of needs and budgets, their own version of
resources" when asking for governmental money, as well as their own
perspective on outside controls. The· danger is that any one-sided
claim on both governmental resources and on the nature of the
evaluations of requests will lead to waste, to extravagant demands for
support, and to exploding governmental budgets. Put simply, it is as if
Gilliom considers the government to be acting only for the purpose of
social control and not for valid administrative purposes, such as fraud
prevention.
Gilliom ignores the necessity for income limits on aid recipients
and the concomitant need for information to enforce these limits. In
the kind of achievement-oriented '.'service administration" that is now
in place at the federal and state levels, information collection is a
central necessity. As one of us wrote over a decade ago, "the state
today depends upon the availability of vast quantities of information,
and much of the data it now collects relates to identifiable individuals.
Indeed, the fulfillment of many governmental objectives depends on
the gathering of such personal information."12
In the specific context of welfare, moreover, administrators have
turned to information processing to avoid two sets of past problems.
First, scarce resources must be distributed among a high volume of
applicants. Gilliom cites scholarship depicting welfare administration
before computerization as "organized anarchy" in which "the effects
of actions or techniques could not even be assessed" (p. 33). Comput
erized information processing appears to offer an alternative to "an
administrative and record-keeping system based entirely on paper
work and oral exchanges" (p. 33). Second, abuses of administrative
discretion within the old system also made a shift to a data-processing
model attractive. These abuses included midnight searches of the
·

12. Paul M. Schwartz, Data Processing and Government A dministration: The Failure of
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1332 (1992).
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homes of welfare recipients and the application of widely divergent lo
cal norms within the same state.13
Gilliom's account is therefore flawed because it fails to recognize
the need for income limits and information collection. Gilliom also
passes over an important area for exploration - the impact of the
massive legislative changes made in 1996 to the long-established wel
fare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC").14
The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") program, es
tablished in 1996, seeks no less than an end to welfare dependency in
the United States. It makes recipients of welfare assistance subject to a
two-year limit on aid and a work requirement.15 Gilliom's book, pub
lished five years after enactment of the TANF, should have evaluated
the extent to which this new statute is encouraging the same kind of
massive, low-profile resistance as AFDC once did. One promising area
for research would be TANF's combination of a work requirement
with a low level of support for child-care services.16 This combination
may encourage the kind of off-the-books activity and other evasions
that Gilliom found prevalent under AFDC.
Gilliom's Overseers of the Poor demonstrates both the impact of
information collection and the response of a particular group of
people to such· surveillance. But this book, despite its value as an
empirical study, is weakened by a too simplistic challenge to informa
tion collection. Failing to acknowledge in any meaningful way that
information collection can be legitimate, Gilliom fails to explore the
tough questions: What personal information should be collected and
what uses should be made of the data?
II.
In the second part of this Review, we explore the relationship
between Gilliom's findings and an emerging critique of privacy law.
This path bring us back to Charles Reich's famous article from 1964,
The New Property. As noted in our introduction, Charles Reich
13. Id.
14.

at 1354.

For a discussion of AFDC, see id. at 1352.

15. The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Act was enacted as the Personal Re
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105. For more on this Act, see the home page of the bureaucracy, The Office of Fam
ily Assistance, which oversees it. The Office of Family Assistance, at
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
16. The current political stalemate over TANF's future sees President Bush advocating
a tougher work requirement and Democrats wanting to increase funding for child care. See
Amy Goldstein, Bush Presses Lawmakers to Back Welfare Changes, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
2003, at A4. Regardless of the issue of resistance by welfare recipients to program obliga
tions, an increasing problem is homelessness among the working poor. See Francis X. Clines,
Life A fter Welfare in the Here and Now of America's Jammed Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2002, at A22.
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argued in this article that in light of changed social circumstances, a
new property in governmental benefits was necessary. Reich observed,
"The wealth of more and more Americans depend upon a relationship
to government."17 Reich found that this reliance on government also
created dependence .,-- especially in the context of public assistance.18
The solution of Reich almost four decades ago was to propose a
property right in government entitlements. Reich argued, "Property is
a legal institution the essence of which is the creation and protection
of certain private rights in wealth of any kind."19 Moreover, property
"performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and
pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to
yield to the owner."20 Property matters, in fact, because it helps
preserve autonomy, or as Reich writes at one point, "the American
character" and the "independent base" from which people can "assert
their individuality and claim their rights."21 Interestingly enough,
Reich links property to privacy.
For Reich, privacy provides a sanctuary that shelters the individual
from the power of the government and organizations in the private
sector. As he notes of the threat that appeared by the 1960s, "The
pressures on the individual are greatly increased by the interrelated
ness of society and the pervasiveness of regulation."22 The conse
quences are potentially dire: "Caught in the vast network of regula
tion, the individual has no hiding place."23 In contrast, a propertization
of government benefits, Reich's new property, would protect liberty.
As Reich proposed, "[T]here must be a zone of privacy for each indi
vidual beyond which neither government nor private power can push
- a hiding place from the all-pervasive system of regulation and
control. "24 Propertization of benefits would create the needed "sanc
tuaries or enclaves where no majority can reach."25 Or, as Reich writes
in developing his privacy-as-sanctuary metaphor, property gives the
individual "a small but sovereign island of his own."26
While Reich demanded the creation of a new property, he did so
based on an "old privacy." Although he did not cite to any privacy
literature in The New Property, Reich's language of privacy-as17.

Reich, supra note 1, at 733.

18. Id. at 758.
19. Id. at 771.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 759.
23. Id. at 760.
24. Id. at 785.
25. Id. at 787.
26. Id. at 774.
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sanctuary evoked another famous law review article. In 1890, Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis in The Right of Privacy conceived of
privacy as the right "to be let alone."27 In their words, the law cannot
merely consider "a man's house as his castle" and then "open wide the
back door" to invasions of privacy.28 This idea is shared by Reich who
writes, "There must be a zone of privacy for each individual beyond
which neither government nor private power can push - a hiding
place from the all-pervasive system of regulation and control. "29
In contrast to Reich, however, Warren and Brandeis were more
than ambivalent about property law. Much of their article analyzes
leading intellectual property cases of their day. Based on their close
reading of these cases, Warren and Brandeis argued that certain judi
cial opinions that seemed to protect only intellectual property rights,
such as a decision stopping an unauthorized publication of a photo
graph, were actually seeking to protect the individual's "inviolate
personality."30 Warren and Brandeis also appeared doubtful whether
property as an institution would be capable of providing a solid basis
for "a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensa
tions."31 Thus, unlike Reich's neat tie between privacy and property,
Warren and Brandeis were less certain that privacy could be protected
through property rights.
The old privacy reached its apogee in tort law and the Restatement
of Torts. In 1960, William Prosser first proposed that the tort of
invasion of privacy be divided into four distinct branches and then, as
reporter for the relevant sections, imported his proposal into the
Restatement of Torts.32 It is essentially this tort-based concept of "old
privacy" that Gilliom attacks in Overseers of the Poor. As we saw in
Part I, Gilliom finds the idea of privacy rights to be absent from the
discourse of welfare recipients. To the extent that the privacy at stake
is a notion of a right "to be let alone," (Warren and Brandeis) or an
idea of an "enclave" beyond the reach of the majority (Reich), it is not
surprising that welfare beneficiaries avoid these concepts. After all, as
Gilliom himself holds,. welfare recipients are "constituted by their
ongoing relationships and status within welfare bureaucracy" (p. 91).
If there is an old privacy, however, there must also be a new one.
We now wish to explore the relationship between Gilliam's findings
27.

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 195.

28. Id.

at 220.

29.

Reich, supra note 1, at 785.

30.

Warren & Brandeis, rnpra note 7, at 205.

3L. Id.

at 206. For an exploration of the ambivalence of Warren and Brandeis to prop
erty-based conceptions of privacy, see Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Pri
vacy, Property and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 668-70 (1991).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A (1976):
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).

William Prosser,

Privacy, 48
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and an emerging critique of privacy law. As developed in writings by
Julie Cohen, Priscilla Regan, Paul Schwartz, Daniel Solove, and oth
ers, a significant attempt has been made in the academy to go beyond
existing "privacy rights" talk.33 These authors, working independently
of each other, have sought to develop a normative basis for an infor
mation privacy law based not in a right of "individual control" over
information, but in the idea of privacy as a social good. Gilliom states:
"[T]he language of privacy rights. is the only show in town" in
academic and policy debates (p. 120). Yet, the new critique of the
individualistic privacy paradigm marks the emergence· of a significant
new approach. From the work of these writers, we see the emergence
of a "new privacy."
Before turning to these scholars, however, we explore the scholar
ship of Robert Post, who provides a key intellectual link between the
old and new concepts of privacy. As noted, the old privacy is tort
privacy, which has its origins in the famous article by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis and the Restatement of Torts as shaped by Dean
Prosser.34 Scholars have frequently seen the privacy tort as concerned
predominately with individual interests, but Post in 1989 offered an
innovative reinterpretation of the classic right of privacy.35
As Post explains, the privacy tort represents not "a value asserted
by individuals against the demands of a curious and intrusive society,"
but a necessary aspect of relations with others.36 Rather than uphold
ing "the interests of individuals against the demands of community,"
information privacy creates rules that in some significant measure
"constitute both individuals and community."37 The fashion by which
privacy standards carry out this constitutive task is by confining
personal information within boundaries that the standards norma
tively define. In Post's words, privacy's function is to develop "infor-

33. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY (1995); Julie E. Cohen, Examined
Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Paul M.
Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control,
and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743 [hereinafter Schwartz, Beyond
Lessig's Code]; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the Staie, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815
(2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, Internet Privacy]; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in
Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace];
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) [hereinafter Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy]; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001) [hereinafter Solove,
Privacy and Power].
34. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 193.
35. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989).
36.

Id.

at 958.

37.

Id.

at 959.

of Privacy: Community and Self in the

Michigan Law Review

2178

[Vol. 101:2163

mation terrorities."38 The establishment of these "information pre
serves" is a critical means for defining social and individual life.39
But how does the privacy tort shape and constitute information
preserves? According to Post, litigants, judges, and juries draw on and
refine the legal e:l(pression of general community norms through open
ended inquiries around language fixed in state tort law and the
Restatement of Torts. The critical inquiry developed in these sources
is whether the "reasonable person" would find certain invasions of
privacy "highly offensive. "40 The resulting legal verdicts confirm or
elaborate shared values and thereby strengthen community.
Here is where the difficulty arises: this legal method worked in the
past, in Post's view, because it rested upon a certain kind of commu
nity. Post argues that "privacy is for us a living reality only because we
enjoy a certain kind of communal existence."41 Yet, we now interact
increasingly with large bureaucracies. The relationships we have with
such organizations are not "social and communal. "42 As Post observes,
these relationships are based on managerial efficiency and lack the
characteristics that are necessary to generate privacy rules.43 One is
reminded of Jtirgen Habermas's warning of the fashion in which
bureaucratic entities engage in a "colonialization of the lifeworld" of
the individual.44 Habermas believes that democratic values both create
and depend on a discursive building of consensus.45 The danger of the
"colonialization" that he decries is that the instrumental views of
bureaucracy will occupy and hollow out the private sphere in which
equal citizens can engage in free discussion and opinion formation.46

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

at 984-85.

40. Id. In other words, the judge or jury evaluates an informational privacy interest in
reference to an act of intrusion or disclosure, and thereby makes a judgment about the ap
propriate use of the related personal information. Id. at 985.
41.

Id.

at 1010.

42.

Id.

at 1009.

43.

Id.

44. 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS 221 (1981).
45.

Id.

46. Id; see JORGEN HABERMAS, STRUKTURWANDEL DER 0FFENTLICHKEIT 27 (1990)
(describing the rise of a public sphere in the eighteenth century and its later fall under pres
sure of mass media, bureaucracy, and "juridification" (Verrechtlichungssphaenomene));
JORGEN HABERMAS, TECHNIK UNO WISSENSCHAFT ALS "IDEOLOGIE" 1 31 (1969) (demon
strating the difficulties of participatory role for the public in discussions between politicians
and experts). Despite the pessimistic conclusions about bureaucracy and information privacy
that we derive from Habermas's work, we wish to note that Michael Froomkin has used
Habermas to derive relatively optimistic conclusions concerning bureaucracy and the stan
dards-setting process for the Internet. See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse. net:
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 11 6 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003).
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Post's work represents an important revision of the old privacy
because he sees privacy, not simply as an individual right, but as a nec
essary precondition for community. Nonetheless, Post's approach is
still an old privacy approach because it rests on the notion of shared,
pre�existing norms of the private. Despite its analytical power, Post's
approach does not provide a foundation for a normative conceptuali
zation of privacy in a bureaucratic, rather than a communal setting.
Post simply considers the bureaucratic realm a domain in which pri
vacy, at least as he conceives of it, cannot exist. To be sure, Post does
furnish a deeper theoretical basis for Gilliom's attack on classic
notions of privacy. His work shows that it is not surprising that Gilliom
finds weaknesses in classic notions of privacy; the subjects of Overseers
of the Poor are located, after all, in a setting in which the assumptions
of the old privacy do not fit. Post accomplishes much, but his work
does not provide help to those who would rethink data privacy in the
Information Age.
Thus, the old privacy, even in Post's hands, proves of limited assis
tance in confronting the modem bureaucratic state. What then of the
new privacy? The proponents of the new privacy provide a guide to
the creation of privacy rules in settings where the assumptions of the
old privacy fall short. Like Post, these scholars reject privacy as an
individual right of control. These authors argue that privacy is a kind
of social good. As Priscilla Regan wrote in 1995, for example, "Most
privacy scholars emphasize that the individual is better if privacy
exists; I argue that society is better off as well when privacy exists."47
The theorists of the new privacy desire protection for autonomy.
As Julie Cohen writes, for example, "Autonomy in a contingent world
requires a zone of relative insulation from outside scrutiny and inter
ference - a field of operation within which to engage in the conscious
construction of self."48 For Cohen, the autonomy fostered by informa
tion privacy generates concrete collective benefits. As she writes, "A
robust and varied debate on matters of public concern requires the
opportunity to experiment with self-definition in private, and (if one
desires) to keep distin.ct social, commercial, and political associations
separate from cine another. "49 Solove made the same connection by
creatively linking the problem of privacy in the modem world to that
depicted in Franz Kafka's The Trial.50 Elaborating on this linkage,
Solove states that The Trial illustrates that "relationships to bureauc-

47.

REGAN, supra

note 33, at 221.

48. Cohen, supra note 33, at 1424.
49.

Id.

at 1426-27.

50. Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 33, at 1422.
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racies which are unbalanced in power can have debilitating effects
upon individuals - regardless of the bureaucracies' purposes."51
One of the authors of this Review has offered an expanded justifi
cation of the right to privacy. Paul Schwartz proposes that information
privacy be seen as protecting both deliberative autonomy and delib
erative democracy.52 Deliberative autonomy is an individual process of
self-governance; deliberative democracy is a group-oriented process
for critical discourse.53 Schwartz's approach highlights the extent to
which privacy is a necessary precondition to a fully functioning
democracy. And, here, the old privacy (as reinterpreted by Post) and
the new privacy agree on the necessary communal basis for privacy:
"[T]he law must structure the use of personal information so that indi
viduals will be free from state or community intimidation that would
destroy their involvement in the democratic life of the community."54
While defenders of the new privacy and the old privacy both see
this interest as vital, they differ in how we should determine the
proper scope of the necessary privacy protections.· Post had seen
the old privacy as generated and protected through tort litigation.
Litigants, judges, and juries were to develop the legal expression of
general community norms through inquiries around issues such as
whether the "reasonable person" would find certain invasions of
privacy "highly offensive. "55 Thus, the old privacy reflects the premise
of shared norms being identified and elaborated through litigation. In
contrast, the generally agreed upon path to the new privacy is through
FIPs, which are generated primarily through the legislative process.
These rules for use of personal data have been discussed and used in
the United States - and on an international basis - since the 1970s.56
FIPs, therefore, predate the work of the theorists of the new privacy,
but have assumed new significance in the work of these scholars.
FIPs are attractive because they offer the chance for autonomy
protection through rules for the use of personal data that are created
51.

Id.

at 1423.

52. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector
Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560-61 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Privacy and Participation]; see Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note 33, at 1650-54.
For the elaboration of the distinction between deliberative autonomy and deliberative de
mocracy, see James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEXAS L. REV.
211, 253-55 (1993).
53. Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note 33, at 1648-56.
54. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation, supra note 52, at 561.
55. For Post, the judge or jury evaluates an informational privacy interest in reference to
an act of intrusion or disclosure, and thereby makes a judgment about the appropriate use of
the related personal information. Post, supra note 35, at 981-82.
56. For a discussion that notes differences between Fair Information Practices in
Europe and the United States, see PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA
PRIVACY LAW 5-17 (1996).
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by democratic institutions - in particular, but not exclusively, by the
legislature.57 That is, at least, the rosy scenario, which we first wish to
sketch before considering a darker picture of FIPs. Where advocates
of the old privacy see privacy norms as preexisting, new privacy advo
cates see them as constructed largely through majoritarian decision
making. Thus, Schwartz proposes, "FIPs can play a significant role in
the construction of multidimensional information territories that
insulate personal data from socially harmful kinds of observation and
use by different parties."58 Or, as Cohen writes, legislating for informa
tion privacy "must delineate the appropriate boundary between
ownership and speech, specify the parameters for effective consent,
and impose meaningful procedural and substantive protections of
information practices."59 Cohen also discusses the need to revisit
certain FIPs on an ongoing basis: "Some fair information practices are
likely to require ongoing regulatory oversight. Others are likely to
require rulemaking at regular intervals."60
What are FIPs to look like? Although the expression of FIPs in
different statutes and regulations will vary in details, sometimes
crucially, a formulation with nine elements is possible: (1) defined
limits, often statutory in nature, for processors of personal information
(purpose specification); (2) processing systems that the concerned
individual can understand (transparent processing systems); (3) notice
to the individual; (4) individual choice or consent regarding the further
use of her personal information; (5) security for stored data; (6) limits
on data retention; (7) data quality (accurate and timely information);
(8) access to one's personal data; and (9) enforcement of privacy rights
and standards, which can involve, often in combination, individual
litigation, government oversight, or industry self-regulation. We return
to these elements of FIPs shortly and assess Gilliom's portrait of Ohio
welfare law in light of them.
In Part II, we have gone from the old to the new privacy and ad
dressed the idea of FIPs. We now return to Gilliom and his Overseers
of the Poor. Gilliom builds on the interviews with the welfare clients to
criticize a privacy paradigm that posits a ruggedly autonomous indi
vidual located in a natural state of solitude. For Gilliom, an individual
cannot be seen "as existing in a free and natural state prior to the 'visi
tation' by a surveillance program and as returning to that state of
privacy and solitude once the observation is completed" (p. 122). In
particular, privacy is not something that can be restored once the
57. For a discussion of the importance of courts in interpreting information privacy stat
utes, see Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy
Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801 (2003).
58. Schwartz,

Beyond Lessig 's Code, supra

59. Cohen, supra note 33, at 1435.
60.

Id.

at 1436.

note 33, at 780.
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surveillance system is turned off. As he writes, "the impact of surveil
lance" is the way it forms "permanent frames of reference, assessment,
and decision" (p. 122). The effects of surveillance include:
degradation, the loss of control, the implied suspicion, the feelings of
being just a number, the anxiety over errors or subterfuges being caught,
the fear of malevolence or incompetence on the part of surveillance prac
titioners, the fear of breaking rules or departing from norms that are un
known, and, especially, the need or desire to break the rules. (p. 125)
As we have seen in this Part, this view of privacy is shared by the
scholars who have developed the new privacy. To return again to
Cohen, she writes, "Autonomous individuals do not spring full-blown
from the womb . . . . [A]utonomy is radically contingent upon envi
ronment and circumstance. "61 And the concerns of these scholars with
deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy is also well illus
trated by Overseers of the Poor. Indeed, both the welfare recipients
and Gilliom's encounter with the local police illustrate the contingency
of autonomy, and the necessity of information privacy, for deliberative
democracy. If adequate rules are not in place for the collection and
use of personal information, citizens will engage in neither criticism of
the government nor unfettered debate about social issues. As Gilliom
insightfully observes, surveillance systems are "both an expression and
instrument of power" (p. 3).
The remaining issue is whether FIPs are likely to have a positive
impact, as the scholars of the new privacy hope, or are doomed to fail
ure, as Gilliom concludes of the privacy rights that he criticizes;
Although he does not explore the concept of FIPs in any detail,
Gilliom depicts their failure within Ohio welfare administration.
Indeed, the problems that Gilliom identifies can be analyzed through a
focus on FIPs.
To begin with, the Ohio system is exceptionally difficult to under
stand. Indeed, Gilliom describes how even caseworkers in Ohio are
frequently at. a loss to explain basic elements of regulation, such as
whether potential employment is permissible or not. It is also clear
that the individual receives notice neither of initial data processing nor
of further data sharing. Limits on data retention appear not to exist.
Moreover, access to one's personal data is generally limited. Gilliom
also notes that any existing requirements of access and correction are
underused. Finally, enforcement of privacy rights is almost completely
absent. As Gilliom describes it, the ignorance, fear and need of wel-

61. Cohen, supra note 33, at 1424; see Schwartz, Internet Privacy, supra note 33, at 821
(discussing "autonomy trap," a belief in choice that ignores "(1) the strong limitations exist
ing on informational self-determination . . . (2) the fashion in which individual autonomy
itself is shaped by the processing of personal data; and (3) the extent to which the State and
private entities remove certain uses or certain types of personal data entirely from the do
main of two-party negotiations").
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fare recipients causes a low level of use of whatever legal interests do
exist (pp. 85-90).
Gilliom's account does not mean, however, that privacy rights
cannot be protected. Most . obviously, a group with better-defined
rights, institutional support, financial resources, and access to legal
resources would be better able to make privacy claims. Indeed, the
lack of institutional support in asserting privacy claims, which is a
principal focus of Gilliom's critique, can be remedied and, in some
circumstance, this remedy can be obtained at a modest price. A recent
survey sponsored by the Center for Policy Research has analyzed the
usefulness of using telephone hotlines to provide brief legal advice and
referrals to low-income people.62 This survey found that telephone
hotlines could be quite helpful; the callers who understood what they
were told to do and followed the advice given tended to prevail in re
solving their problems.63 Telephone hotlines might also be created to
give a target population privacy advice, such as regards available FIPs.
In large measure, however, this Review has stuck to the rosy
scenario about FIPs. One can also be decidedly less positive regarding
these standards as potential safeguards for autonomy and democracy.
As we have seen, FIPs should be defined by the legislative branch and
administrative agencies, and, by Cohen's suggestion, even frequently
revisited as technological and other changes occur. The first danger for
FIPs is of data-collection creep - the legislature and administrative
agencies, whether focused on welfare or other areas, may prove likely
to increase information collection, processing, and sharing. The second
danger is that the legislature and administrative agencies may create
only watered-down FIPs or dilute existing ones. The result will be
weak or ineffective FIPs.
As for data collection creep, Gilliom notes that obtaining welfare
in Ohio involved answering roughly 770 questions (p. 34). One can
imagine no better example of excessive data collection. As for the
weak or ineffective FIPs, the lack of notice to individuals, and the
absence of a transparent, or understandable, information processing
system are also notable in Gilliom's portrait of Ohio welfare admini
stration. The danger is that these kinds of data processing systems be
come a way to keep deserving applicants . from obtaining welfare potentially deserving recipients may either be scared off or over
whelmed by paperwork and other requirements.64

62. Jessica Pearson & Lanae Davis, Ctr. for Pol'y Research, The Hotline Outcomes As
sessment Study: Final Report - Phase Ill: Full-Scale Telephone Survey (Nov. 2002), available
at http://www.clasp.org/NLADA/DMS/Documents/1037903536.22/finalhlreport.pdf.
63.

Id.

64. For a discussion of how welfare applicants can be overwhelmed by paperwork re
quirements, see Schwartz, Privacy and Participation, supra note 52, at 1359-60.
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There can be no underestimating the dangers of data-collection
creep and weak FIPs. Here, we offer three concluding observations.
First, we need a constant internal critique of data-processing systems
that collect personal data. Put differently, bureaucratic rationality is
anything but rational - recall the 770 questions asked of welfare
applicants in Ohio and the way that data collection practices become a
bar to assisting the needy. Those interested in information privacy
must be ready to show where data collection and processing are
unnecessary, are disproportionate to the ends sought, or are ill
designed to meet stated goals. This kind of analysis should draw on the
perspective not only of the new privacy, but of administrative law,
computer science, and economics.
Second, the kind of participation and process available under the
old privacy tort has no real equivalent in the bureaucratic world of the
new privacy and FIPs. Thus, the issues of inadequate support levels in
AFDC and inadequate allowances for child care under TANF, are not
something that FIPs can resolve. Moreover, as Post points out, we will
not be able to discover communal norms in the bureaucratic world of
administered social services. The second-best strategy? To try to struc
ture the greatest transparency possible about the process of creating
information processing systems and shaping FIPs. Information will
also be needed about the functioning of the resulting systems.
Overseers of the Poor, a largely empirical work, enriches the theo
retical debate about information privacy. It shows how a particular
group in a ·particular context thinks about governmental attempts to
use information. Based on his empirical study of welfare recipients,
Gilliom critiques what we have termed the "old privacy" in this
Review. His data can also be used to deepen an analysis centered on
the new privacy. As Gilliom suggests, classic old privacy conceptions
provide scant help when people do not engage in privacy-rights talk
and when interactions are with a bureaucratic organization. Moreover,
the threat to individual autonomy that Gilliom chronicles is a signifi
cant problem.
The new privacy seeks to confront precisely the issue of the threat
to autonomy that is raised by data processing in bureaucracies. The
new-privacy scholarship calls for majoritarian construction of privacy
standards that will, in tum, help foster the individual autonomy neces
sary for majoritarian governance. Drawing on his case studies, Gilliom
finds the old privacy irrelevant to the world he describes. But the
Overseers of the Poor also shows why the new-privacy scholars are so
worried about threats to autonomy. It demonstrates the importance of
developing privacy standards in law to help preserve the individual
capacity for self-determination.

